

19 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: First Meeting of Team B on Soviet Strategic Policies and Objectives - 18 August 1976

1. Attendees included:

Richard E. Pipes, team leader

[redacted] NIO/Coord/CA

William Van Cleave

General John Vogt

[redacted]

Seymour Weiss

Paul Wolfowitz

General Daniel O. Graham

[redacted]

2. General Jasper Welch arrived after the meeting and was briefed by [redacted]

3. Dr. Pipes hopes to recruit Paul Nitze to work with Team B.

4. Dr. Pipes opened the meeting with a brief description of the background of the competitive analysis project and distributed copies of Robert Galvin's (PFIAB) letter to Director Bush which set forth the purpose of the experiment and the procedures to be followed. Dr. Pipes also noted that there is no fixed definition of this Team's mandate from PFIAB, and perhaps that's just as well. Pipes expressed the hope that as a result of this project either the method of drafting the NIE will change or that Team B will become a permanent part of the NIE process. The participants agreed that:

(1) The product of the Team B effort will be a "lawyer's brief".

(2) The Team will work as "subpanels", membership of each subpanel to be decided at the 25 August meeting.

(3) The NIE deals with the strategic threat in isolation from political and other considerations. (Pipes)

(4) The NIE doesn't really address itself to the question of general (global) Soviet strategic objectives.

(5) The NIE is based on unwarranted assumptions, for example, that the USSR regards strategic nuclear power as the central factor in its great power aspirations and that the Soviet military effort is fundamentally defensive.


During the discussion of point (3) above, Weiss stressed the political utility of the Soviet military forces in exerting pressure on the U.S. and Vogt observed that Soviet forces in Europe are aggressive in character. In an aside Graham noted that he is studying the question of whether the Soviet attitude is still Clauswitzian; his opinion is that it is.

5. Wolfowitz suggested that the Team should give some consideration to the transfer of technology from the West to the USSR.

6. The Team members decided to bring in experts in various fields at a later date to brief the members on controversial or technically complex issues. Possible briefers included:

General Keegan - lasers
Gus Weiss
Jim Wade - NSC - 68 (through Wolfowitz)
T.K. Jones - civil defense
Joe Braddock
Fred Wickner
Andrew Marshal - economics
Gordon Negus
Al Flax
Doak Barnett - China
Fritz Ermarth
Colin Gray



7.  suggested that Marshal and Ermarth be invited to discuss existing 11/3-8. Pipes repeatedly stressed that

Team B has a short time to complete its draft. The members agreed to the following schedule:

25 August	meeting, 2 - 4 P.M. Members to present their criticisms of NIE 11/3-8 and suggest issues to be considered by Team B; decide on briefings;
8 September	2 - 5 P.M. meeting to review memos produced by individual members and/or subpanels and prepare outline of report;
15/16/17 September	briefing by outside experts; individuals and topics to be decided at 25 August meeting;
17-24 Sept.	drafting of the Team B report; length to be 20-25 pages by R. Pipes;
27-28 Sept.	dissemination of the draft to team members and possibly to Wohlstetter, Ed Teller, and John Foster for critique;
October	draft revision, conferences with Team A, criticism of Team A product.

Paisley noted that if the team felt it critical to have more time available it would be necessary to get PFIAB agreement to extend Team B's time limit.

8. Members offered to devote the following time to the project.

Pipes	- Tuesday - Thursday through late September
Van Cleave	- Tuesday - Thursday until 20 September; thereafter Mondays and Tuesdays
Wolfe	- 2 1/2 weeks in first half of September
Wolfowitz	- 2 days a week
Graham	- 1 day a week
Amb. Weiss	- several days in September
Welch	- couple days a week
Vogt	- one or two days a week
Others	- indefinite

25X1 9. Pipes agreed to establish a "basic library" of documents for team members to be available daily in the Ames building offices. (These documents were ordered from OPR, OSR, and NIO after the meeting adjourned; the complete "library" will be available Monday, 23 August.) Members should also feel free to request any additional materials through [redacted] They also might arrange appointments with qualified government personnel through him.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OLC 77-3366

Office of Legislative Counsel

Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

12 AUG 1977

Dear Bill:

By letter of 1 August 1977, the Director notified Chairman Inouye that General Daniel Graham and Paul Nitze held appropriate clearances to review the Select Committee's full A Team-B Team report, and that the clearances for Richard Pipes had been reinstituted for this purpose. The Director's letter emphasized the need for strict security measures.


It is my understanding that Mr. Pipes and General Graham have read the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report, and subsequently asked for access to certain materials relevant to the preparation of their B Team report. The only materials thus far specifically identified, minutes of B Team meetings and B Team recommendations, are enclosed. Please afford these the same security protection given the other material being reviewed, and return them to the Agency when they are no longer needed.

As other documents directly related to the B Team study are specifically requested by General Graham, Mr. Pipes, or Mr. Nitze, we will endeavor to make them available, under the same security procedures.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

SIGNED


Acting Legislative Counsel

Enclosures

Declassified When Separated
From Enclosures

EX-105 REGISTRY FILE

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board

THROUGH : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Recommendations of Team "B" - Soviet
Strategic Objectives

In our critique of current and previous National Intelligence Estimates, we made a concerted effort to identify those aspects of methodology, procedure and institutional structure which we believe have contributed to unsound estimative judgments. In the attached paper we proffer our recommendations to PFIAB concerning improvements in methodology, procedure and structure aimed at correcting the perceived deficiencies. Evidence for our conclusion that the cited shortcomings do, in fact, exist in the NIEs is to be found in the main body of our report.

Professor Richard Pipes, Team Leader

Professor William R. Van Cleave, Team Member

General Daniel O. Graham, Team Member

The Honorable Paul Nitze, Advisor

Ambassador Seymour Weiss, Advisor

Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Advisor

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Team "B" Recommendations

1. Concerning methodology

A. Mirror Imaging. To overcome the bias toward viewing Soviet motives and intentions in U.S. terms, it is urged that:

1) In dealing with Soviet intentions, the NIEs should integrate observed and projected Soviet weapons' programs and force deployments derived from the "hard" physical data with more thorough analysis of historical, political, institutional, and other "soft" factors shaping Soviet motives and intentions. The search should be for a consistent elucidation of both sets of factors and their interaction. In this connection considerably more attention should be paid to relevant open and clandestinely acquired Soviet pronouncements and writings (especially those directed to internal audiences) than has been the case in the past. In this regard it should be understood that expert analysis of the open material can reveal a great deal, insofar as the Soviet political system often compels the Party to issue to its cadres authoritative guidance on policy matters through unclassified sources;

2) Soviet objectives should be perceived in terms of Soviet concepts: this rule applies especially to the treatment of concepts like "strategy", "strategic threat" and "strategic objectives", all of which should be understood in the Soviet context of "grand strategy." When, for reasons of convenience to U.S. consumers, the NIEs address Soviet military programs in the U.S. rather than the Soviet strategic context, this fact should be made clearly evident to the reader.

B. Net assessing.* Whatever their intentions, the drafters of the NIEs do engage in implicit net assessments of sorts, particularly when advancing major judgments in the executive summaries. These

* What we mean by net assessment in this context is a judgment on the balance between U.S. and Soviet military capabilities based on the relevant static indicators extant or projected, or based on a dynamic analysis of the balance assuming that those capabilities actually are to be called into use. The latter type of net assessment assumes a scenario, but may or may not assume actual warfare.

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assessments are usually so rough, so poorly documented, and essentially so speculative that they invite -- indeed, cannot be immune from -- the injection of the authors' general biases. Where NIE judgments demand net assessment, the netting should be done explicitly, analytically, and thoroughly, not implicitly or perfunctorily. The interface between NIE judgment and net assessment should be identifiable.

C. An integrated view of Soviet weapons and force developments. The NIEs tend to an excessive extent to analyze each Soviet weapon system in isolation from the totality of the Soviet military effort (and indeed from other relevant non-military factors as well), with the result that the overall Soviet military effort appears as less significant than it actually is. Team "B" urges that in the future weapons systems and force developments be examined in a more integrated manner to yield "combined evaluations" more indicative of Soviet total military capabilities and overall intentions.

D. Policy pressures and considerations. In the opinion of Team "B", total avoidance of policy pressure on the intelligence estimating process is an impossible goal. The normal and proper function of policy makers in raising questions which are to be addressed by the intelligence estimators in and of itself influences the answers the latter provide. Some awareness on the part of the estimator of the impact of intelligence judgments in support of or in opposition to policy is unavoidable. Nonetheless, improved methods and procedures adopted for the preparation of the NIEs should be able to minimize the policy pressure on judgments and prevent the abdication by the intelligence apparatus of its responsibility to provide objective answers.

E. Disciplined presentation of conclusions. Key judgments of NIEs are presented in various styles and formats. This on the one hand permits statements to be made with a certainty that is not warranted by the available evidence, and on the other hand permits statements, better supported by the evidence, to be degraded in the reader's mind through the insertion of a clause or sentence that have the effect of dismissing their impact. A more disciplined (though not necessarily rigid) format for NIE key judgments, summaries, and conclusions should be constructed. The format and style should ensure that the various reasonable interpretations of the available evidence are laid out without semantic embellishment; that the pros and cons of evidence supporting each are discussed briefly; that the likelihood of occurrence of each is assessed; and that the requirements for additional data to resolve remaining uncertainties are identified. Further, each major intelligence estimate should contain

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as an annex a review of the past 2 to 10 years' "track record" of U.S. estimates on the major aspects of the relevant subject matter. Such an annex would be best prepared by a body of analysts not responsible for the estimates critiqued. The purpose of such an annex would not be to criticize or chastise but rather to throw light on possible trends of misanalysis or mistaken judgments so that a compounding of error by continuation into future intelligence estimates can be avoided.

2. Concerning procedures.

A. Some, though undoubtedly not all of the methodological shortcomings which Team "B" found in the National Intelligence Estimates can be overcome by improving the process of their preparation and review. The authors of the NIEs will always remain in some measure prone to perceive the USSR in U.S. terms and to allow political considerations to affect their judgments. Nevertheless by minimizing inherent institutional biases and broadening the range of judgments brought to bear on the NIEs it should be possible to weaken considerably the impact of factors which have accounted in the past for NIE misperceptions.

B. Team "B" considers the organizational position of the NIE function within the national defense - security - foreign policy complex less than optimal for guarding against both policy and institutional biases. Current and previous organizational entities charged with preparation and processing of NIEs have been subordinate to the Director, CIA, and staffed almost exclusively with CIA officials. This arrangement was intended to compensate for the real or alleged biases of the Departments of Defense and State, but it can over-compensate by encouraging the institutional biases of the Central Intelligence Agency itself.

C. Team "B" recommends that some combination of the following three steps be considered:

1) The first involves building as much immunity to institutional pressures as possible into that entity which is charged with preparing NIEs on Soviet strategic objectives. There are various ways to accomplish this end. One attractive possibility is to identify an official in the Executive Office of the President who would be charged with assuring such immunity and who would report directly to the President. His staff would be small and guarded against acquiring an institutional life of its own. Members of the staff would be drawn from the various intelligence organizations and serve relatively short tenures (3-4 years). The official charged with this function would be genuinely removed from and independent of the operating membership of the NFIB by the devices of a separate budget, a separate staff, and a separate physical location. He should have the authority to subpoena substantive intelligence officers from any agency and to require

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of pertinent departments and agencies such net assessments as may be necessary to the NIE process;

2) The second step involves the marshalling of expertise in and out of government to offset the temptation to mirror-image. The official charged with assuring the objectivity of the NIEs (as specified above) should enlist the part-time services of a panel of prominent outside specialists for the purpose of reviewing estimates so as to identify judgments that are based on questionable assumptions concerning Soviet strategic doctrine and behavior. Such reviews should be carried out immediately post facto, but they should not form a part of the NIE preparation process itself.

3) The third step involves periodic independent checks on both the process and the substance of the NIEs by employing procedures similar to the PFIAB-conceived Team "B" approach. Intermittently, perhaps initially every second year, a team of outside experts who owe no formal responsibility to the existing governmental intelligence agencies would be assembled to play the adversary role. The composition of the Team would vary every time. Team members would have available all the pertinent information from all the sources. The effort would be reasonably time constrained. The report of the Team would be subject neither to review nor to revision but would be made available directly to the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. (After the Team had made its report, it would become available to other governmental agencies for criticism but not for revision). While this step would not eliminate the particular views and biases which the non-governmental experts would bring to their study, it would be free of the bureaucratic pressures or biases of the existing governmental intelligence -- or indeed policy -- agencies.

D. Team "B" has not addressed itself to substantive national intelligence issues other than Soviet strategic objectives. Should similarly critical issues arise -- e.g., with regard to China or the Middle East -- the above recommended processes could help to ensure objective intelligence support to top policy makers.

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7 December 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of Team B, Soviet Strategic Policies
and Objectives, 2 December 1976

1. Attendees:

Richard Pipes
Daniel Graham
Paul Nitze
Thomas Wolfe
Paul Wolfowitz

2. Pipes opened the meeting with some brief remarks on the possibility of declassifying the Team B report and then read a memorandum from Richard Lehman which rejected the declassification option. Pipes said that he would urge PFIAB to make the Team B report available to as large an audience as possible. If his appeal to PFIAB were rejected, he suggested that the team members could meet to discuss other alternatives. He mentioned as one possibility the publication of articles on the general subject of the Team B report without reference to classified information. He said that large parts of the Team B report contain no classified information and therefore publication is a valid option. Pipes also raised the possibility of using the Freedom of Information Act to get the report into the public domain. Graham said he thought that this was an unrealistic approach.

To prevent unauthorized declassification of sensitive sections of the report, Graham said that he felt it would be advisable to declassify the report as far as possible.

Wolfowitz said that he feared that selective leaks, which distort the true character of the report, would be used to discredit the Team B effort. He suggested classifying the report by paragraph to allow publication of unclassified sections. Graham noted that DIA followed this procedure and Pipes expressed interest in this approach. commented

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that CIA does not normally follow this procedure and discussion of this option was dropped. Wolfowitz then suggested that Part III of the report, which he said contains no classified information, should be declassified and published as a separate document.

Nitze suggested that the Team write separate papers on the topics covered in the report but at a lower classification (Confidential to Secret) to ensure a wider audience.

Pipes suggested that further discussion of this subject be postponed until the Team had an opportunity to discuss its concern with PFIAB.

3. The members discussed some minor changes in the Team report and reviewed Graham's draft of the recommendations.

/s/

[Redacted Signature]

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13 September 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Joint Meeting of "B" Teams - 9 September 1976

1. Attendees:

Richard Pipes
General Graham
General Vogt


Paul Wolfowitz
Jim Drake
Roland Herbst
Charles Lerch

2. The meeting was called to exchange information on the full scope of the Team B effort.

3. Richard Pipes spoke briefly about the work of the Strategic Policies and Objectives Team. (See Memorandum for the Record, 26 August 1976 and 8 September 1976)

4. Roland Herbst spoke on ICBM accuracy. He said that the panel is concerned primarily with the accuracy of new Soviet systems, specifically the SS 16, 17, 18, and 19. His group believes that these systems were designed to be highly accurate. The level of accuracy can not be determined from design; accuracy depends on the quality of the guidance system. His group believes the Soviet instruments are better than the NIE estimates. No data is available on the quality of the guidance systems used in the SS 18 and SS 19. But Herbst and members of his group believe the Soviets are working hard to improve the accuracy of these systems.

Herbst noted that the Soviets test their missiles from operational silos. The US does not and this gives the Soviets an advantage. Graham agreed with this point and added that the theoretical accuracy of system does not interest a soldier; he is interested in the wartime effectiveness of a system.

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Herbst commented on the US experience with the Minuteman guidance system to make the point that a guidance system can get better or worse than expected. Experience with a system and the ability to calibrate make a big difference.



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5. Charles Lerch spoke on the subject of Soviet low altitude air defense. The basic question for his group is what is the strategic defense capability of the Soviet Union.

Lerch criticized the NIE for making a net assessment of the Soviet low altitude defense capability. He said that both the B-52 and B-1 would have great difficulty penetrating Soviet air defenses and added that he would not want to attempt to penetrate Soviet air defenses.

Drake said that the Soviets have a large number of air defense weapons and could greatly reduce the number of penetrators - probably to about 10 - 15% of the original force. Lerch noted that each air defense installation would have to handle one or at the most two penetrators at one time. Drake and Lerch agreed that the cruise missile is an effective means of counteracting Soviet air defenses but noted that development of the system by the US is in doubt.

Drake said that Soviet exercises do not emphasize low altitude air defense as much as we think they should. However, Lerch countered that the number of such exercises is increasing.

Lerch and Drake agreed that a small number of defense posts have been identified but more could exist.

On the air defense problem both said there is too much data to evaluate in the time available. Even in the intelligence community, more data exists than have been thoroughly analyzed.

6. During general discussion of the Strategic Policies and Objectives report, [] repeated his belief that the NIE tendency to underestimate Soviet capabilities is a cyclical - periods of underestimation follow period of overestimation. Political pressure is another factor in the cycle. He also said that the Soviets have a belief in the inevitable victory of communism and believe that the mind is the ultimate target.

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25X1 [] and Graham agreed that the Soviet view of the strategic balance considers more than military hardware. The Soviet view includes the "correlation of forces". As another example of the difference between US and Soviet thinking, Wolfe said the Soviets are concerned with how to win a war while the US is concerned with how to prevent a war.

Graham said that he believes the US has three important advantages over the Soviet Union: a superior economy, superior technology and better morale. Vogt generally agreed but noted that in the strategic area some believe the Soviets have achieved parity with the US and in some fields may be ahead. In any case, the Soviets are making a concerted effort to achieve a technological breakthrough.

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9 September 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Third Meeting of Team B on Soviet Strategic Policies and Objectives - 8 September 1976

1. Attendees included:

Richard Pipes, team leader
General Daniel Graham
William Van Cleave
General John Vogt
General Jasper Welch

[redacted]
Paul Wolfowitz

2. Dr. Pipes reported on his meeting with Robert Galvin, who chairs the PFIAB subcommittee that is in charge of the Competitive Analysis experiment. Pipes gave Galvin a copy of his memo, "Purpose, Scope, and Plan of Team "B" Report" and told him that he believed sections IV and VI "The Soviet Strategic Threat, 1976-85", will be the heart of the Team report.

3. Galvin told Pipes that the length of the Team B report presents no problem to the members of PFIAB. It was Galvin's opinion that the report would be discussed at PFIAB's meeting in December. He also agreed with the two basic purposes of the Team B report and said that in its report the Team could make recommendations for improving the NIE. Galvin also indicated that the Team can consider the question of domestic political pressure on the NIE process. The Team members agreed that this was a factor worth considering but agreed with Pipes' comment that it would have to be handled with caution.

4. [redacted] distributed a draft on ASW and noted that it had been reviewed by [redacted]. Commenting on the report, Welch said that the Team must be aware of the tendency to mirror-image on capabilities, intentions and scenarios. He also noted that the possibility of short term deployment of systems might be considered. Welch said that short term deployment can be effective and can usually be done quickly and at far less cost than long-term deployment.

[redacted] may provide a

5. Graham distributed a draft on Civil Defense and suggested that other drafts might follow his format: Discussion of NIE position, Presentation of the evidence, Analysis/Estimate, Forecast. Pipes and Vogt liked the format and suggested that it be tried in other drafts. Vogt felt that one of his reports on C & C and hardening might be added to Graham's CD draft. Pipes agreed that some elements of Vogt's report might be incorporated into Graham's but felt that it should remain a separate report.

Pipes and Vogt also noted that US observers frequently refuse to take the Soviets at their word even when they repeatedly and publicly take the same position.

25X1 6. Vogt read his draft on C & C and hardening. (Copies will be available to team members on 9 September.) Pipes repeated his belief that Vogt's C & C report should not be fused with Graham's CD report. In response to a question from [] Vogt said that there is no disagreement over hardening figures in the intelligence community. There seemed to be general agreement that the Soviet C & C and hardening effort indicate that the Soviets are going beyond mutual deference and are determined to survive and win in the event of war. Pipes said that Soviet publications frequently speak of World War III in terms of when, rather than if.

7. Vogt read his draft on the Backfire. (Copies will be available to team members on 9 Sept.) Vogt said the Backfire is clearly a strategic weapon and noted that many of those who reject this position classify the US F-111 as strategic even though its unrefueled radius is lower than the lowest estimated radius for the Backfire.

Vogt noted that the Soviets are determined to get a high assurance factor and are willing to increase the number of strategic weapons. They believe the number of weapons available is very important. He added that while the US tends to consolidate and thus reduce the number of targets the Soviets tend to disperse thus increasing the number of targets. He said that the US use of nuclear weapons is limited by a number of factors including the number of targets to be hit and the amount of radiation fallout we are willing to expose our allies to.




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Commenting on the current controversy over the Backfire range, Graham noted that it was similar to an earlier conflict over the Badger. Vogt noted that Brezhnev and the Chief Soviet military advisor at SALT have used different figures on the Backfire range.



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Pipes commented that the NIE tends to hedge on the Backfire in rejecting a strategic role for the Backfire but noting that it could be strategic if certain things were done.

8. Welch indicated that his draft on anti-satellite testing was incomplete. He said the Soviets have a semi-operational anti-satellite system capable of hitting targets in low orbit but nothing to take care of future satellite systems (ten year time frame).

Wolfowitz noted that the Soviets have not taken a clear position on what constitutes "national means of verification".

Pipes felt that this subject could be dropped if no threat is apparent to the team members. Graham disagreed. Wolfowitz and Graham agreed that the Soviets tend to take a more skeptical view of US-Soviet relations than the US does.

Graham said the Soviets do not rule out war as an extension of politics. They are building forces to fight a war and get deterrence as a fringe benefit. Vogt disagreed. He said that the Soviets would rather avoid war and have built forces so strong that the US will be reluctant to use strategic nuclear weapons to defend territory. Vogt said the size of the strategic forces on both sides reduces the credibility of the US deterrence. He added that the Soviets are ready to use superior conventional forces to take Europe because the US nuclear deterrence will not readily be used.

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Pipes said if the Soviets achieve nuclear superiority they can then make use of their superiority in conventional forces.


9. Vogt read a report on Mobile ICBMs (SS 16 & SS 20). (Copies will be available to Team members on 9 September.)

Vogt noted that the NIE does not cover the question of convertibility of these systems. [] asked why the Soviets are making the systems convertible. Is it to ensure survivability or to multiply the number of weapons they can put on target? [] said that he believed it is difficult to determine Soviet motives.

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Graham responded that survivability of multiple systems depends on the intelligence ability of the other side. He said that the evidence suggests it is a matter of numbers, now or in the future, rather than survivability.

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11. Van Cleave distributed a report on Depressed Trajectory.

Graham commented that it is important not to drive intelligence to prove the negative. He said the community could reasonably expect to detect evidence of Soviet testing of depressed trajectory systems.

Pipes said that the NIE tends to draw firm conclusions from inadequate data and this may be an example.

Welch said that this capability can be developed quickly so the point is how the NIE handles the question.

Vogt asked why the Soviets would not opt for this capability. Welch said this is mysterious. Wolfowitz said that part of the Soviet philosophy is to conceal important capabilities. Welch countered that in this case the Soviets have little to gain by concealment. Graham said that analysts still tend to work on the basis of clear US superiority which no longer exists.

12. Graham distributed a report on Soviet defense spending. Graham said he intends to add new evidence on total Soviet expenditures for defense. Pipes questioned the value and purpose of computing the cost of Soviet defense expenditures. Others agreed with Pipes' statement but noted that it had originated under McNamara and had to be done to meet his demands. This was the period of the whiz-kids and great concern over cost-effectiveness, according to Graham.

It was noted that while there is competition for defense rubles within the military there is no effective competition from the civilian sector for resources. Pipes said the distinction between civilian and war expenditures does not exist in Soviet society. Even Soviet culture is USO, i.e., morale boosting. The Soviets do not consider the military a social overhead but rather a social benefit.

13. Pipes closed the meeting at 1645 and said the reports not discussed at this meeting would be considered at the meeting on 15 September. He also reminded the members that an informal conference with some members of the other two "B" teams was scheduled for 9 September at 1 P.M.



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26 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Second Meeting of Team B on Soviet Strategic Policies and Objectives - 25 August 1976

1. Attendees included:

Richard Pipes, team leader
General John Vogt
General Daniel Graham
William Van Cleave
Paul Wolfowitz

2. Dr. Pipes made a brief opening statement. He said that he wanted to prepare an agenda for the subteams and establish a definite list of briefers for the 15-17 September briefing sessions. He advised the members to read The Track Record in Strategic Estimating.

3. Pipes stated the Team has two tasks: (1) to reinterpret the data made available on strategic weapons and the threat they pose to see if a different estimate of threat is possible. If Team B does come up with a different interpretation, it should make as strong a case as possible for its position. Task (2) is to criticize the methodology underlying the NIE process. Pipes distributed a list of suggested topics for the Team to investigate.

4. The Team members agreed that a two part report would be produced.

- 1) evidence and conclusions: all contributing with Pipes drafting final text;
- 2) criticism of methodology: Pipes drafting with contributions from other members.

5. The meeting was opened to more general discussion. Graham said that he had read several of the NIE 11/8 reports. He said that he noted a change in tone and nomenclature over the years as well as a general tendency to put U.S. perceptions and terms into the Soviet vocabulary.

Van Cleave believed that the topics suggested by Pipes were too technical. Pipes, with Vogt concurring, explained that he did not envision a technical paper but felt that the Team had to address and indicate areas of uncertainty. Vogt added that the incomplete evidence used in the NIE process often does not support the conclusions reached by the drafters. As an example, Graham cited the Soviet civil defense effort and agreed with Vogt's comment that the Soviet CD effort is aimed at a reconstitution capability. Graham said he believed the Soviets want to assure a sustaining force and a second strike capability.

There was general agreement that the NIE underestimates the seriousness of the Soviet CD effort and assumes that the U.S. could make an immediate response. Vogt said an immediate response is unlikely.

Vogt also noted that the U.S. has no real air defense capability. Van Cleave added that as the SALT negotiations are proceeding it appears that the Soviets could develop a bomber force outside the SALT agreements.

Wolfowitz suggested that the Team check out any new evidence on dismantling of the SS-7. Vogt and Van Cleave commented that Soviet concealment and deception efforts make verification of the SALT agreements difficult. Both agreed that the Soviets appear to have rejected the thesis that numbers do not count. As the number of targets increases, the number of deliverable warheads must increase to ensure destruction of important targets.

Pipes and Graham, with agreement of the members present, commented that the NIE assumes, without evidence, that the Soviets want to spend as little as possible on defense.

6. The Team agreed on a list of topics and volunteered to direct their efforts as indicated below:

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25X1

[] offered secretarial support for the Team.

25X1

[] Weiss, and Welch will be asked to work on topics in which they have particular expertise.

Team B Strategic Policies and Objectives will check with the other sections of Team B to see how broadly they have interpreted their charters.

In response to a question from Van Cleave, Pipes said that he felt there would be no problem with funds for moderate travel by Team members as this could be handled through SRI.

7. Graham opened the discussion on methodology with the comment that the NIE, from the time of the McNamara era, has made net assessments which are not supported by the evidence. He also said there is a tendency to mirror-image when writing about the Soviet military effort. As a final point he noted that every estimate since 1962 has used the impact of economic pressures in the Soviet system as the fundamental reason for a judgment of the Soviet military effort.

Pipes said there should be two aspects to the critique of the NIE process:

1) noting that the estimate is based on assumptions which are not spelled out, for example, that the Soviet military effort is basically defensive and that the Soviets want to spend as little as possible on weapons, etc.;

2) technical flaws in the process of preparing the NIE.

Van Cleave commented that the NIE seems to reject the idea of unanimity in the Soviet decision making process and suggested that some attention be given to party-military relations.


Graham noted that the NIE process forces compromises on controversial issues.

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8. The Team agreed to invite the following individuals to brief:

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- NIE process
- Soviet strategic weapons and their role in Soviet strategic thinking
- economic aspects of the Soviet strategic effort
- lasers & other directed energy weapons
- Soviet command and control, hardening as well as the thrust of the Soviet strategic effort

Sherman Kent
James Schlesinger


- NIE process
- NIE process
- JCS problems with the NIE process

25X1

Possible additional briefers:

Paul Nitze
James Angleton

25X1

 agreed to contact the briefers and schedule them for the 15-17 September briefing period. Tentatively it was agreed to schedule one briefing in the morning and two in the afternoon. Briefing sessions are to be limited to one and one-half hours.



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